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APPORTIONMENT OF THE JUDICIAL RESOURCES
IN CRIMINAL CASES: SHOULD HABEAS
CORPUS BE ELIMINATED?
PAUL C. WEICK*
T HF problems with which this article deals-arise from our dual
federal-state relationship; from the jurisdiction to determine fed-
eral claims, which jurisdiction Congress has distributed to both
state and federal courts; from jurisdiction granted to the Supreme
Court of the United States to review errors of federal law in state
court judgments; from federal habeas corpus proceedings under
which state court convictions are reviewed and sometimes set aside,
where such convictions are in violation of the Constitution of the
United States; and from civil rights actions in which lower federal
courts supervise and control the disciplinary procedures and condi-
tions in state prisons. In my judgment, habeas corpus should not
be eliminated but its misuse should be curbed. Should this be ac-
complished, there would undoubtedly be an opportunity for better
apportionment of judicial resources.
I
Historically, such cases as Ex Parte Watkins' propounded the
effect that the Great Writ was available only to review judgments
of conviction which were void for lack of jurisdiction. "Conse-
quently, only challenges of nonjudicial detentions without proper
legal process or of confinement by the judgment of a court without
competence in the matter could be heard on federal habeas cor-
pus."2
The expansion of the scope of the writ began, perhaps, in Ex
* Judge Weick received his LL.B. from the University of Cincinnati and an
LL.D. from the University of Cincinnati. Judge Weick serves on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. He previously served as Chief Judge, Sixth
Circuit 1963-1969. He has served as Past President Akron Bar Association and
Ohio State Bar Association.
1. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
2. See, Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REV.
1038, 1045 (1970).
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Parte Siebold.3 There, the Court reaffirmed the jurisdictional na-
ture of the inquiry, stating:
The only ground on which this court, or any court, without some special statute
authorizing it, will give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under a conviction and
sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person
of the cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void.4
An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law. An offense created by it is not a
crime. A conviction under it is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void and
cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment.5
This general rule stated in Watkins and Siebold was then slowly erod-
ed. In Frank v. Mangum,6 the Court, apparently not entirely abandon-
ing the jurisdictional concept, held that the original jurisdiction of
the state's criminal court could be lost if, during the course of the
trial, the defendant was deprived of his constitutional rights. To
the same effect is Johnson v. Zerbst,7 which also held that Con-
gress had expanded the rights of a habeas petitioner so as to pro-
vide for a more searching investigation with authority of the court,
upon determining the facts, to "dispose of the matter as law and
justice require." 8  Moore v. Dempsey9 held that a conviction in vio-
lation of the due process clause was void.
Habeas corpus no longer lay only for jurisdictional defects in
the trial court's proceedings. In Waley v. Johnston,'° the Court
abandoned this notion, and said:
It extends also to those exceptional cases where the conviction has been in disregard
of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective
means of preserving his rights."1
Soon, however, even this "exceptional circumstances" doctrine
gave way to the availability of the writ to remedy any violation of
federal constitutional rights. Brown v. Allen'2 held that all federal
3. 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879).
4. Id. at 375. Emphasis added.
5. Id. at 376-77.
6. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
7. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
9. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
10. 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
11. Id. at 105.
12. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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constitutional questions raised by state prisoners were cognizable in
federal habeas corpus. 3
The Supreme Court has also held that the doctrine of res judicata
does not prevent a habeas court from relitigating issues of law or
fact which have been resolved previously in the state system, or at
the federal trial or appellate level. The district judge has power
to determine anew the facts of a case:
Unless a vital flaw be found in the process of ascertaining such facts in the State
court, the District Judge may accept their determination in the State proceeding
and deny the application. On the other hand, State adjudication of questions of
law cannot, under the habeas corpus statute, be accepted as binding. It is precisely
these questions that the federal judge is commanded to decide. 1 4
Congress has the power to distribute among the courts of the States and of the
United States jurisdiction to determine federal claims. It has seen fit to give this
Court power to review errors of federal law in State determinations, and in addition
to give to the lower federal courts power to inquire into federal claims, by way of
habeas corpus. 1 5
This expansion of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction reached its
climax with the 1963 trilogy of Townsend v. Sain,'0 Fay v. Noia,'7
and Sanders v. United States.' Townsend held that it was the
duty of the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing if a
state court petitioner did not receive a "full and fair" hearing in
the state court, but nevertheless made it clear that the judge could
find the facts de novo, even if the petitioner had received such a
full and fair hearing in the state court. Moreover, the Court out-
lined six situations in which a hearing must be held. Fay held
that waiver of a federal claim could be had only by considered
choice of the petitioner, and that the exhaustion of remedies re-
quirement referred to currently available state court remedies only.
And finally, Sanders held that a second or subsequent habeas peti-
tion could be denied on the basis of a previous petition's denial
only if the same issues were again advanced, the prior determina-
13. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), held that all constitu-
tional claims are also grounds for Section 2255 relief for federal prisoners.
14. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953), Mr. Justice Frankfurter, con-
curring.
15. Id. at 508-09.
16. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
17. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
18. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
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tion was on the merits, and if justice would not be served by
reaching the merits. Thus, habeas relief did not differ significantly
from relief which one could seek under direct appeal.
II
Concurrently with the enlargement of the habeas jurisdiction,
there was a great expansion of the constitutional rights of persons
accused of crime. These expanded rights included application of
a number of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to state criminal
trials, provisions which previously had been held not to apply; 9
the assistance of counsel in state criminal cases;20 the prohibiting
of comment by prosecutors on the failure of defendant to take the
witness stand, which comment was permissible under the Constitu-
tion of a state;2 the prohibiting of in-custody interrogation of sus-
pects by police, except under specific guidelines adopted by the
court;2 2 expanded concepts of coerced confessions; 23 expanded due
process rights;24 the right to confrontation; 25 the right of jailhouse
lawyers to prepare and file habeas corpus petitions, including
briefs; 26 the right to counsel at lineups27 and at preliminary hear-
ings ;28 various search and seizure rights ;29 and the creation by the
Supreme Court of a new federal remedy for asserting a claim for
19. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
20. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
21. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406
(1966).
22. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
23. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
24. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), suppression by prosecution of evi-
dence favorable to the accused; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969),
vindictive sentence on retrial; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), coerced
plea of guilty; Giglio v. United States, cert. granted 401 U.S. 936 (1972, No. 70-29),
prosecution's duty to present material evidence.
25. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965).
26. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
27. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
28. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
29. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
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damages against federal officers for the alleged violation of the ac-
cused's Fourth Amendment rights.30
This remedy could easily be expanded to embrace any amend-
ment, or even any provision of the Constitution. That it will result
in an avalanche of suits filed in the already heavily burdened Fed-
eral Courts, was stated by Mr. Justice Blackmun in his dissent.
Mr. Justice Black expressed fears that "such suits might deter
officials from the proper and honest performance of their duties."
To put it mildly, this remedy has resulted in the opening of a
Pandora's box. This is evidenced by the decision of the Second
Circuit, on remand,3 which decision removes immunity rights of
federal officers that were thought by many courts to exist, and the
decision subjects the officers to the heavy burden of defending
themselves in such suits. As pointed out by Chief Justice Burger
in his dissent, the creation of such new remedies had best be left
to Congress, which could make provision for the proper handling
of the litigation and could adopt provisions to protect the public
interest.
It is indeed fortunate that the Supreme Court made many of
its rulings prospective in application,32 otherwise there would have
been a mass exodus from the prisons.
That all of these decisions have placed a heavy burden on the
federal courts is an understatement. The observations by Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson in his concurrence in Brown v. Allen33 would appear
to be accurate:
mhis Court has sanctioned progressive trivialization of the writ until floods of
stale, frivolous and repetitious petitions inundate the docket of the lower courts and
swell our own. 3 4
In a footnote to this comment, Mr. Justice Jackson observed:
There were filed in federal district courts during 1941 one hundred twenty-seven
30. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, - F.2d - (2d Cir., Docket No.
32537, decided March 8, 1972).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Adams v. Illinois, - U.S. - (1972, No. 70-5038); Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Tehan
v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Link-
letter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
33. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
34. Id. at 536.
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petitions for habeas corpus challenging state convictions; in 1943 there were two
hundred sixty-nine; in 1948 five hundred forty-three; in 1952 five hundred forty-
one.
3 5
Two decades later one cannot help but agree with Judge Friend-
ly's observations on the number of petitions, and with Mr. Justice
Jackson's comment:
Despite the safeguard intended to be afforded by the requirement of a certificate of
probable cause, there were over twice as many appeals by state prisoners in 1969 as
there were petitions in 1952. A similar explosion of collateral attack has occurred
in the courts of many of the states. If 541 annual petitions for federal habeas
corpus by state prisoners were an 'inundation', what is the right word for 7,500?36
An examination of available statistics reveals the extent of this
increase in inmate-generated petitions filed in the federal courts in
the last decade. In 1961 habeas petitions filed in the district courts
by state prisoners totaled 1,020, whereas federal prisoners filed 868
such petitions. By 1971, these filings amounted to 8,372 and 1,671
respectively. In addition, in 1961 federal inmates filed 560 mo-
tions to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and by 1971
these filings totaled 1,335. Civil Rights actions have also risen in
number. In 1966, when statistics first became available, state pris-
oners filed 218 such petitions, and federal inmates filed 15. By
1971 the total filings had grown to 2,915 by state prisoners, and
214 for federal prisoners.37
Nor is this increase in number of petitions filed limited to the
district courts; appeals from the granting or denial of these petitions
now occupy a significant portion of the workload of courts of ap-
peal. In 1971 there were 1,665 appeals of state prisoners filed in
courts of appeal, amounting to 13 % of the total filings. Of these,
1,149 were in forma pauperis appeals by state prisoners from the
denial of habeas corpus relief.3 s
35. Id. at 536, n.8.
36. See, Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack On Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U. CHi. L. REv. 142, 144 (1970).
37. Figures taken from the 1971 Annual Report of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, § II.
38. 1971 Annual Report, supra, note 34 at 11-13, 14. Filings in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the last three years were as follows:
1969 1970 1971
Appeal from denial of habeas, state prisoner* 900 1099 1149
Appeal from denial of habeas, federal prisoner* 107 47 128
Appeal from § 2255 Motion to Vacate Sentence* 103 81 69
Direct Application for writ of habeas corpus 22 54 36
* In Forma Pauperis.
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The latest report of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts reveals that the number of habeas corpus filings may
be stabilizing, but that the increase is being absorbed by Civil
Rights petitions:
The volume of prisoner filings, after doubling in the last five years-and nearly
hitting 16,000 in 1970-has apparently stabilized. Total state and federal prisoner
matters deposited in federal courts in 1971 edged up a mere 269 cases, from 15,997
to 16,266. That is only a 1.7 percent increase. Last year's increase was 24 per-
cent. Within the total picture, however, state habeas corpus petitions have taken a
surprising downturn and a new subcategory of prisoner filing-civil rights-has
moved sharply upward.8 9
Thus, one sees that not only habeas corpus actions have been in-
creasing in number, but prisoner actions under the Civil Rights
Statute, § 1983, have also been intensified (complaining about
state prison conditions and disciplinary proceedings). Moreover,
the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in Morrissey v.
Brewer,40 a case involving the validity of state parole procedures,
which could conceivably lead to an avalanche of petitions by those
presently incarcerated.
Certainly a large percentage of the increase in habeas petitions by
state prisoners after 1963 can be attributed to the decisions in the
Townsend, Fay, and Sanders trilogy, and to the concurrent expan-
sion (by judicial decisions) of the rights of the accused. Un-
doubtedly these decisions have necessitated a great expenditure of
time and effort through additional hearings in district courts. Fur-
thermore, they have aggravated the federal-state relationship and
have resulted in a public reaction unfavorable to the judiciary, the
reaction being that the courts have shown greater concern for the
fights of the criminal than for the protection of society. Conse-
quently, there has been great disrespect for the law and a substan-
tial increase in the crime rate, which even endangers national se-
curity.
The principles of law enunciated in these decisions are, of course,
intended to achieve commendable results, i.e., judicial procedures
ensuring that the constitutional rights of the accused are protected,
for, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter appropriately emphasized, "[T]he
history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of pro-
39. Id. at 11-45.
40. 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3288 (1971).
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cedural safeguards."' 41  But in protecting the rights of the accused,
the rights of society and of the victims to security in their persons
and property ought not be forgotten. Nevertheless, these decisions
have created a situation in which petitioners can (and do) litigate
continually the validity of their incarceration. Finality in the crim-
inal process takes place only upon the release or demise of the
prisoner. Such conditions led Chief Justice Burger to say, in re-
marks to the American Bar Association:
The public is tired of the spectacle of appeals that lag for years and repeated appeals
whose chief purpose is delay. I must repeat what I said to you at St. Louis last
August: There must be finality at some point.42
Such a statement reflects the frustration of many judges over
the large number of frivolous, meritless, and repetitious petitions
that continually emanate from prisoners. The mere citation of de-
cisions under sections 2254 and 2255 in 28 U.S.C.A. fills two
volumes in fine print. (This is not to mention the concern felt
by many federal judges over the extent to which they must con-
tinually pass upon questions of law that have already been decided
by the highest court of a state). This frustration is worsened by
the fact that the same petitioner can, and often does, file repetitive
habeas applications, alleging repeatedly the same grounds for relief.
This situation reveals the tension that exists between the well-known
positions expressed by two eminent jurists:
It must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of
worthless ones. He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up
with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search. 43
It has been said of habeas corpus cases that one who searches for a needle in a hay-
stack is likely to conclude that the needle is not worth the effort. That emphasis
distorts the picture. Even with the narrowest focus it is not a needle we are looking
for in these stacks of paper, but the rights of a human being.44
41. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
42. Chief Justice Burger, "State of the Federal Judiciary," Address delivered in
New York, N.Y., July 5, 1971; see also, Dissent by O'Sullivan, J., in Goodwin v.
Cardwell, 432 F.2d 521, 523 (6th Cir. 1970), in which there is outlined the history
of Townsend's (of Townsend v. Sain fame) 17 years of efforts at post-conviction
relief. Add to it the latest and successful effort, Townsend v. Twomey, 322 F.
Supp. 158 (N.D. 111. 1971) which has been appealed by the state. See also, Attorney
General John N. Mitchell's Address, Restoring the Finality of Justice, JUDICATURE,
Dec. 1971, Vol. 55, No. 5.
43. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537
(1953).
44. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1, 25
(1956).
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It is rather apparent that both of these judges are correct. The
real task of our legal system is to devise procedures that provide
a greater degree of finality in litigation, assist in sorting out the
frivolous petitions, and reduce their number, while ensuring that
the rights of any individual are not violated; rather, we must en-
sure existence of procedures that will provide better opportunity to
find the "needle" or petition deserving redress.
For these reasons it would not be advisable to abolish habeas
corpus in view of the fact that there are occasional cases in which
a person's rights under the Constitution have been violated, and
habeas corpus is his only effective remedy.
III
As before stated, a significant portion of habeas corpus and sec-
tion 2255 motions filed are not the prisoner's first petition; and
often too, no new grounds are alleged in these subsequent petitions.
Although issues of fact and law previously resolved can be reliti-
gated on habeas corpus, principles of finality, such as "identical
grounds" or "abuse of remedy" rules, can operate in some in-
stances to bar a subsequent application. 5 These principles were
initially designed to encourage a petitioner to set forth all of his
claims in one application; nevertheless, there seems to be little rea-
son inherent in the post-conviction process for a prisoner not to
set forth in his first application, in the best possible way, all grounds
which he thinks might have merit:
Most prisoners, of course, are interested in being released as soon as possible; only
rarely will one inexcusably neglect to raise all available issues in his first federal
application. The purpose of the "abuse" bar is apparently to deter repetitious appli-
cations from those few bored or vindictive prisoners whose intent is to harass, to
attract attention, or simply to get out of prison for a day to testify in an evidentiary
hearing.4 a
Consequently, it would seem that if a first petition is adequately
presented, a bar on subsequent applications would not take away
from petitioner the opportunity to litigate, fairly and completely,
his federal claims in habeas corpus. Although such an approach is
eminently plausible, the law as it now exists pays only lip service
45. ,28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Supp. IV, 1969).
46. Supra note 2, at 1153-54.
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to this one-petition requirement, because, in fact many petitions do
not adequately present all of a petitioner's grounds.
Sanders v. United States enunciated the circumstances under
which a prior petition is dispositive and the district court can sum-
marily dismiss any subsequent petition. First, the new petition
must contain the same "ground" which was determined "adversely
to the applicant" in a prior habeas corpus or section 2255 proceed-
ing. The Court broadly interpreted "ground" to mean any claim
depending upon the same set of facts, whether or not suported by
different legal theories or combinations of those facts.47 Moreover,
the prior claim must have been rejected on the merits; thus, a dis-
missal for lack of jurisdiction, improper pleading, or failure to ex-
haust state court remedies, would be insufficient to bar a subsequent
application. Finally, the Court requires the district court to deter-
mine that "the ends of justice would not be served" by reaching the
merits of a subsequent application.4 Although the petitioner has
the burden of showing that "justice" would be served by a second
determination on the same ground, this criteria essentially allows
the judge, in his discretion, to hold a second hearing. In order
to make elaborate determination required by Sanders, however, a
judge must look into the allegations and facts, and spend time
evaluating the case. Often very little extra effort, short of an evi-
dentiary hearing, would be required to deal with the application on
its merits.
There are, of course, a number of reasons why a petitioner fails
to present claims adequately in his first petition, even though his
efforts are made in good faith. Some prisoners lack education; in
such case petitioner's first efforts may be nearly incomprehensible,
sometimes written by pencil on tissue paper and so lacking in such
specificity or relevant facts that the petition results in summary dis-
missal. Later, perhaps after contacting a jailhouse lawyer, or when
counsel is appointed for him, the petitioner is able to present his
claims in such a way that they merit a hearing, or at least deserve
a second disposition on the merits, even if his claims do not ulti-
mately entitle him to relief. Another may simply be ignorant as to
47. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16 (1963).
48. Id. at 15.
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applicable law, and mistakenly fails to present his best claims.
Years later, for any number of reasons, such a petitioner may realize
that his best claims remain. These examples suggest in part why
many prisoners file successive petitions which have to be deter-
mined.
Even if a prisoner files only one application, often considera-
tions of timing make it difficult to reach an adequate conclusion
concerning the claims alleged, because the petition is brought long
after the trial. This can happen because a prisoner does not realize
that he has a claim, perhaps, until he meets someone in a similar
situation, or contacts a resident jailhouse lawyer. Occasionally, the
petitioner may simply delay in order to diminish the possibility of
retrial.
IV
In order to reduce the burden of multiple petitions, to assist
those same prisoners in presenting their claims in the best possible
manner, and to ameliorate the difficulties outlined above, the fol-
lowing proposals are suggested:49
Title 28, U.S.C. Section 2254 should be amended so as to pro-
vide:
1. Counsel shall be appointed for any indigent applicant to advise
him of his rights and to represent him at the hearing and in
in any appeal.
2. An applicant shall set forth in his application or in any
amendment thereto, prior to or at the hearing, all claims which
he may have for violation of his rights under the Constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States. Any claims not so set
forth shall be deemed to have been waived and the court shall
not have jurisdiction to consider the same in any subsequent
proceeding, unless the claim not previously set forth is based
on newly discovered evidence which, in the exercise of reason-
49. For additional proposals (although different from those offered here) which
are designed to deal at one hearing with all of a petitioner's federal claims, see:
A.B.A. Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, "Standards Relating to
Post-Conviction Remedies," Jan. 1967; 1968 Report of the Judicial Conference on
Habeas Corpus, 33 F.R.D. 363, 382; Hon. James M. Carter, "Pre-Trial Sugges-
tions for Section 2255 Cases," 32 F.R.D. 391. See also, Younger, State v. Uncle
Sam, 58 A.B.A. JOURNAL 155.
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able diligence could not have been presented at the time of
the hearing, and is presented to the state court within the time
of the hearing, and is presented to the state court within the
time limited by state law, but in the absence of such law not
later than two years after his conviction.
3. The application for the writ shall be filed within sixty days
after all available state remedies have been exhausted, or with-
in sixty days after his conviction in the state court has become
final under the laws of that state, whichever is later.
4. The judgment of the District Court shall, subject to the right
of appeal, be final as to all issues raised or which might have
been raised in the proceeding, with the exception of a claim
based on newly discovered evidence, as provided in 2 above.
5. In all cases in which the application has been denied, the ap-
plicant may, within ten days thereafter, file in the Court of
Appeals a motion for leave to appeal, which leave shall be
granted if the court finds that a substantial question is pre-
sented.
At present there is no limitation of time within which a state
prisoner may file in the federal court an application for writ of
habeas corpus. The petitioner may wait as long as he pleases be-
fore invoking his federal remedy; sometimes several years elapse
before an application is filed. The time limitation proposed would
coordinate federal habeas corpus with the state appellate or post-
conviction process and would eliminate unnecessary delay.
Under the foregoing proposal, where petitioner has newly dis-
covered evidence, he must present his claim first to the state court
within the time limited therefor by state law, and in the absence
of such law, then not later than two years following the date of his
conviction, which is the federal limitation on newly discovered evi-
dence. Rule 33, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pro-
posal requiring leave to appeal from a denial of the writ, should
facilitate the disposition of frivolous appeals. Res judicata is a
time-honored principle of law universally applied in civil cases. A
cogent reason why it should not be applied in criminal cases as
well does not exist. Closely related to res judicata is collateral
estoppel, which was recently applied by the Supreme Court against
1972]
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a state in a habeas corpus proceeding to review a state court con-
viction. In Ashe v. Swenson,"0 the Supreme Court held that the
state was foreclosed from relitigating in a second trial an issue
determined in the first trial, although each trial was for a different
offense. While this ruling favored the defendant, it could be in-
voked against a defendant in an appropriate case, for it is a poor
rule which does not work both ways, but rather favors only one
party.
We are here talking about a defendant who has been convicted
by a jury in a state court, who has made a direct appeal to the
state court of appeals and the state supreme court, and who has
the right to petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court of the
United States, and who then invokes the state's post-conviction pro-
ceedings for a collateral attack on his judgment of conviction, fed-
eral habeas corpus, and federal appellate procedures. After all of
these procedures have been exhausted, it ought to be time for the
case to come to a conclusion. What more should be provided?
Such procedures in which we now indulge, are unheard of in Eng-
land, wherein lies the source of our common law.
The proposals above outlined provide both to petitioners and to
the administration of criminal justice, a greater number of benefits
than those provided under our present system. There is no reason
why these proposals should be limited to state prisoners, for there
would flow from their application desirable consequences to federal
inmates as well. The applicable provisions of section 2255 should
be amended also, to provide for substantially the same procedures
in dealing with motions to vacate sentence brought by federal in-
mates.
The first, and perhaps the most important benefit to be gained
from this proposed hearing, is that it would impart finality into the
criminal justice process. Then, one could no longer criticize the
American system of criminal justice, with words approximating
those of a former Attorney General:
[P]risoners are almost entirely free under present law to have their convictions
relitigated again and again on the basis of alleged constitutional infirmities . . ..
This is an exploitation of the court system. Today's notions of habeas corpus are
not only inconsistent with the writ's historic tradition, but serve more often than
50. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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not to frustrate justice rather than to promote it .... [T]he use of collateral
attack, which was intended only as an extraordinary remedy, must be brought under
manageable control in order to restore some balance to the judicial process.51
In addition, greater finality would have its impact on the process
of rehabilitation, for finality has been characterized aptly as the
beginning of the rehabilitative process, the ". . . realization by the
convict that he is justly subject to sanction, that he stands in need
of rehabilitation ... 52
This single-hearing procedure would also result in greater fair-
ness in the criminal justice system for all persons involved. First,
it would be fairer to the prosecution than is the present system, in
that when prejudicial error is found and a conviction is set aside,
the prosecution would have a practical opportunity for a retrial.
Today, while proceedings drag on, witnesses die, people move away
from trial locations, and memories fade. Only during the first few
years following the conviction is retrial a feasible alternative. The
proposed sixty-day limitation on the filing of an application for writ
of habeas corpus, would result in fewer instances wherein retrial is
not feasible.
Second, the proposed hearing procedures would be fairer to the
inmate-particularly the poor inmate-than is the present system.
Each prisoner would be informed by counsel of his opportunity for
this hearing, and its significance would be explained to him. No
inmate would have to search in the dark for violations of his rights,
or rely on the questionable talents of a jailhouse lawyer for redress,
because counsel would be available for all; and each prisoner would
have the benefit of a federal court review of his federal constitu-
tional claims, separate and apart from the stresses and strains of the
guilt-determining process.
Finally, the proposals are fair to the courts themselves. The
number of petitions filed would diminish, particularly those incom-
prehensible petitions drawn by the nearly illiterate inmate who has
no idea what a petition for writ of habeas corpus entails; instead,
petitions would be submitted by counsel.
Hopefully too, counsel would perform a screening function and
51. Mitchell, supra n.39 at 204.
52. Bator, Finality In Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452 (1963).
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would endeavor to convince prisoners who have only frivolous
claims, that it would be a waste of time to litigate. Moreover,
where new evidentiary hearings are had, factual determinations
would be made more easily than is now often the case when events
long past must be reconstructed.
Another factor contributing to decrease the number of habeas
corpus petitions would be the drastic reduction in successive peti-
tions; and most such petitions (or petitions filed after expiration of
the sixty-day limit) could be summarily dismissed without an ex-
amination of the merits.
Also, this type of hearing would tend to assuage, at least in
part, the bitter feelings that have arisen in the past between state
officials and courts, and the federal judiciary. Federal courts would
no longer be required continually to examine the validity of state
convictions long after trial; finality would allow state correctional
agencies to proceed with their lengthy and difficult task of prisoner
rehabilitation.
Since any reversal would occur relatively closer to the conviction,
state defendants would no longer be released without the state's
having the viable alternative of retrial. Because this proposed re-
view of the conviction would become an institutionalized part of the
criminal justice process, at a definite time, both state and federal
planning would be facilitated, and states would be able to anticipate,
in some rational manner, this one efficient and speedy review of
federal constitutional claims.
Finally, for those who value coherent, rational systems, this pro-
posed hearing would restore some semblance of order to the federal
post-conviction process.
In order to further provide a better apportionment of judicial
resources and to assure greater adherence to the principle of feder-
alism, it is suggested that state prisoners be required to exhaust
their state remedies before resorting to federal courts in civil rights
actions. This simple expedient, already required in § 2264 ha-
beas corpus proceedings, would result in many civil rights actions
being finally resolved in courts of the state where the controversies
arose. This would relieve the federal courts of the unpleasant task
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and the steadily increasing burden of supervising conditions of con-
finement and disciplinary procedures of state penal institutions, a
job which was never intended for the judiciary. The notion that
federal judges are more competent than state judges to handle these
cases is pure nonsense.
V
Whether or not one accepts the proposals set forth above for
improvement of the federal habeas corpus process, one cannot dis-
pute the fact that better, more comprehensive state court post-con-
viction procedures would go a long way toward easing the heavy
burden that habeas corpus places on federal courts, and would help
also to provide improved federal-state relations.
In 1958 the Conference of State Chief Justices, reacting to the
Supreme Court's decisions involving state prisoners, recommended:
State statutes should provide a post-conviction process at least as broad in scope as
existing Federal Statutes under which claims of violation of constitutional right
asserted by State prisoners are determined in Federal courts under Federal habeas
corpus statutes.53
In addition, it has long been acknowledged that such improved
state procedures would be helpful to the federal courts. "[T]here
is a widespread feeling that the major reason for the increasing bur-
den on the federal courts is the failure of some states to provide
an adequate forum for the protection of constitutional rights. 54
Consequently, if all of the states would adopt procedures afford-
ing comprehensive post-conviction relief, and would do so in co-
ordination with federal courts, the result could not help but be bene-
ficial. Perhaps a giant step toward these goals came with the
Chief Justice's proposal, made at St. Louis, for the creation of a
State-Federal Judicial Council in each state. The idea for this kind
of cooperation has been so well received that at last count there were
in existence at least forty such Councils. 5
A good example of the results which can be accomplished by co-
53. H.R. Rep. No. 1293, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1958).
54. See, The Burden of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions from State Prison-
ers, Note, 52 Va. L. Rev. 486, 501 (1966); see also, Freund, Remarks at Sym-
posium on Federal Habeas Corpus, 9 UTAH L. REv. 27, 30 (1964).
55. Burger, supra note 39.
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operation between state and federal courts is the improved post-
conviction procedures adopted by the Supreme Court of Missouri."
Without question, our present post-conviction procedures are in
need of drastic change in order to eliminate inordinate delay and
to effect some semblance of finality in post-conviction procedures.
It is hoped that the proposals offered in this article will be of some
assistance to those who are engaged in the awesome task of bring-
ing about meaningful improvement in the administration of crim-
inal justice.
56. Oliver, "Post-Conviction Applications Viewed by a Federal Judge-Revis-
ited," 45 F.R.D. 199 (1968).
